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Planned and Unplanned Bequests
ABSTRACT
We make the distinction between bequests that are planned as part
of some lifetime optimization stemming from a bequest motive, and those
that are unplanned and result when the date of death differs from what
the consumer might forecast. Lifetime optimization should lead to a
negative effect or no effect of the expected horizon on the size of the
bequest, and to a negative relation between unexpectedly long life and
the bequest.
Using data on wealthy decedents and their parents, we form
measures of the expected horizon based on parents' longevity. There is
no relation between unexpectedly early or late death and the bequest,
but a significant positive relation between the bequest and the length
of the horizon. Several explanations for this unforeseen result are
offered, including the inference that uncertainty about length of life
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A growing literature has begun to study the role of intergenerational
transfers in households' life—cycle behavior. In part this increased interest
has stemmed from the apparent inabil it',' o-fsimpleversions ofthetheory of
1 i-fe—cycle decision—making to account for such phenomena as the close
correspondence between age—earnings and age—consumption profiles (Nagatani
1972; White, 1978) and the inexplicably high average level of savings, far
above what could be explained solely by planned saving for retirement
(Kotl ikoff—Summers, 1981). Saving for bequests has been proposed as an
extension a-f the life—cycle theory that might reconcile these phenomena, and
some evidence on the magnitude and determinants of bequests has been presented
(Merichik—David, 1983).
What is missing from this reconciliation is any direct evidence that the
bequests that are made are in fact an expression of people's tastes for
passing on wealth to their offspring. Current evidence prevents one from
distinguishing between this possibility and an alternative that views bequests
as the assets that remain at the death of risk—averse consumers who cannot
purchase actuarially fair annuities or catastrophic health insurance due to
problems of adverse selection. In this study we construct a method that could
allow us to examine these alternatives. The method is based on the
distinction between planned and unplanned bequests, a distinction we try to
make operational by introducing a proxy for individual differences in the
planning horizons that will in part affect the amount of such transfers.
II. Bequests and Horizons
Twoissuesmust be considered in distinguishing the effects of the
—1—horizon on bequests: 1) What does a more distant horizon do to the amount of
thetransfer, other things equal? and 2) I-F the plarin rig horizon proves to be
incorrect, what are the effects of the mistake on the transfer? We take these
questionsinorder, assuming throughout that the consumer has point
expectationsabout the horizon T*. We assume that the wage rate and hours of
workare fixed, sothat earnings per period are not subject to choice and, for
the moment, that lifetime earnings too are exogenous. Finafly, we assume that
the consumer horizon is fixed, though we examine the effects on our
conclusions of relax ing th is assumption.
Following Blinder (1974) we assume the consumer seeks to maximize:
(1) 1T* U(C(t))e dt + B(KT*),
where C is consumption, p is the rate of timepreference,KT* isthe bequest,
and U and B are the components o-Ftheutility function defined over
consumptionand bequests, with UO) =B'(o)=. Total utility (1) is




KT* + C(t)e dt,
where W0 is initial wealth, E is the present value o-F lifetime earnings, and r
is the rate at which households can borrow or lend.
The solution to this maximization problem includes the conditions:




Condition (3b) states that the marginal utility of a dollar of consumption at
—2—T* equals the marginal utility of dollar given inbequests.Together with the
lifetime wealth constraint, conditions (3a) and (3b) imply initial
consumption, terminal wealth (the bequest) and the pattern of consumption over
time. Implicit in the solution is the notion that the consumer equates the
discounted marginal util ityofconsumption, V'(C(t)),acrossall time periods
t, U t T*.
Let T* increase, all else, including lifetime resources, remaining
constant.1 (Essentially we are comparing two otherwise identicalpeople at the
samepointin time whose life expectancies differ from one another for some
reason.) Then if C(t) decreases for any t, it must by (3a) decrease for all
t, including T*. If C(T*) decreases, though, the discounted marginal utility
V'(C(T*)) must increase. The only way (3b) can still be satisfied if this
occurs is if KT* decreases also. Similarly, if C(t) increases for any t, it
must increase in all periods, and must increase also. Since C<t) cannot
increase for all t, this demonstrates that an increase in the length of the
planned horizon reduces the amount of the bequest if lifetime resources remain
constant, assuming an additively separable utility function. It isalso
easily shown that increases in and E increase the size of KT* if T* is
constant.
Maintaining the assumptions of fixed lifetime earnings and point
expectations about the date of death, consider now how imperfect forecasting
of that date affects the bequest. If consumers reach T* and are still alive,
they reallocate KT* according to a new utility—maximizing plan derived at T*
and projected forward to some new horizon, T** )T*.The assumption that the
marginal utility of consumption approaches infinity as C approaches zero
guarantees that consumption will be positive for all t > T*, and thus that
actual bequest, KT, will be less than K1.
—3—H consumers diesuddenly at T < T* they bequeath
(4) KT =KT*e_T*_T) + C(t)er(T t)dt;
=
KT*+ fT* C(t)er(T t)dt —
KT*[l_er(TT)l
Whether the amount actually bequeathed at the date of death,K1, exceeds or
fallsshort of the planned bequest, K1., depends on the relative magnitudes of
the last two terms in (4). Some insight into this issue can be gained if we
assume T =fl—iarid operate in discrete time. The comparison of the last two
terms becomes a comparison of C(T*) and rKfl i.e., a comparison of the
resources that are not consumed, because the person dies unexpectedly, to the
interest that is lost on the amount that the person planned to bequeath at T*.
(KT > KT* if C(T*) > rK1.) Since there is some evidence (Merichik—David,
1983) that bequests are on average not more than five years of consumption,
unless r exceeds .20, c(T*:i > rK. This implies that K1 >I(; together with
the discussion of the case of unexpectedly long life, it indicates that
unplanned bequests are negatively related to unexpected extra years of life.
The analysis thus far has assumed lifetime resources are unchanged by
changes in T*. To the extent wecanmeasure lifetime resources well this
assumption makes sense. However, if they are measured imperfectly,
differencesin T* will represent differences in lifetime income as well. Thus
ifconsumption, leisure and bequests are normal goods, an interior solution to
the consumer's maximization would imply lifetime resources and bequests both
rising as T* increases. If lifetime earnings are large relative to initial
wealth,errors in measuring them willproduce a poE.itive relationship between
T*and the amount of bequests.
Dropping the assumption of fixed resources may also affect inferences
aboutthe impact of a deviation of the date of death from T* Without
-4—specifying a dynamic model of utility maximization defined overconsumption,
bequests and labor supply, we cannot infer the effect of this deviation on the
amount bequeathed if lifetime resources are variable. However, if the
consumer survives beyond an initial planning horizon T*, and had planned to
retire before T*, the unexpected extra years of life will probably reduce the
actual bequest below KT*. Having already retired the person is uni ikely to
reenter the labor force.2 Resources are fixed as of T*, and the arguments made
above that < K apply. Since most people do plan some period of
retirement, we may assume that unexpectedly long life reduces bequests in most
cases. Thus people who live an unexpectedly long time will bequeath less than
otherwise identical people whose expectations about T* are fulfilled. ilso,
if death occurs before T* and the person had already retired, 1<T> 1<1*.
If the person had planned to work until T*, or if death occurs before
retirement, no unambiguous conclusion about the effect of a deviation from T*
is possible. The outcome depends on the relation of the age—consumption and
age—earnings profiles, and on the relative magnitudes of planned lifetime
earnings and If initial wealth is much greater than annual earnings, KT
>KT* even if T*—T is large (since the lost earnings comprise only a small
fraction of lifetime earnings).
Other inferences can be drawn based on observations of patterns of
- 3 - retirement.Assume there is some normal retirement age, perhaps 65. If r*is
below this retirement age, the person is more likely to have planned to work
until T*. Ihat being the case, an unexpectedly early death will reduce
I ifetirrie resources and make it less likely that KT KT*. Similarly, if death
occurs substantially before the normal retirement age, it is more likely that
thepersonhad planned additional years of work, and thus more likely that the
observed bequest will fall short o-fwhatwasplanned.Thro'jqhout this discussion we have assumed that theexpecteddate o-f
death,T*, is cc'ristarit evenas tincreases. This is unlikely: Consumers, as.
shown by Harnermesh (1985), are aware that the expected ae at death is higher
the cider one is.If wespecify amodel that allows horizons to be updated
(dT*(t)/dt :>0),KT* will fail continually with t. However, each
worker/consumerwilldie "earlier than expected,' and thus each will leave
positive unplanned bequests. Given two worker/consumers with identical
resources and the same age and 1*, the one whodiesearlier after retirement
will leave a larger unplanned bequest. Thus even if people do continually
update their forecasts of the horizon as they age, we should still find that
unplanned bequests are negatively related to T—T*.
III.Data andEstimation
Thediscussion in Section 11 suggests estimating:
(5) K. =+T' + 82T + 83 W. +84
M.
whereis initialwealth, M islifetime earnings, iis.an individual, and Tu
is the number ofyearsof unexpected IifeIfMismeasuredwithout error, or
ifMis small relative to W,we shouldobserve that 0;regardless of
these provisos, we should also find $384) 0. Inorder to separate planned
from unplanned bequests we need to derive some method ofdeterminingthe
consumer's horizon. While simple actuarial data provide somedistinctions
among individuals, the effects of differences in horizons based on such data
cannot be distinguished from those based on age and cohort differences (since
theseare whatdetermine theactuarialdata) except because of the underlying
nonlinearities. Accordingly, wecalculatethe years remaining until death,
T*, as.:(6) T* =e0+P NPARGE8O -)NPARLT6O
e0 is the expected years of remaining life based on data from actuarial tables
at time t; NPARGE8O is the number of the person's parents who survived to age
80, and NPARLT6O is the number who did not survive to age 60. The coefficients
P and Y are fixed at 3 and 2, reflecting the findings on subjective horizons
in Hamermesh (1985).
The formulation of T* in 6 is implemented in two ways. First, we
calculate T*1 as of the fixed chronological age of 55 for all observations.
Second, we calculate T*2 as of the date when the secor!d parent of the
individual in question died. Thus for each person the forecasted horizons
will reflect parents' longevity as well as the actuarial life expectancy for
people of their sex during their lifetimes. Throughout the study we assume
=
T—T*1
and TU2= T—T*2, where T is the years of life remaining from the time
1* is calculated.
The data set is from Connecticut and was used by Menchik (1979) to
examine the relation between the estates of parents and those of their
offspring. It covers men and women who died between 1939 and 1976 and whose
parents left large estates. These data are especially suited to this problem,
as they contain information on the decedents' estates as well as on bequests
the decedents had received (a partial measure of W). They also contain
information on the age of death of the individual and of one or both parents,
as well as the individual's date of death. The people in the sample had very
large inherited wealth, a mean of $202,560 (in 1967 dollars), a median of
$50,844, and a range from $0 to $2,917,757. Even though we ma>' measure
1 ifetime earnings with error or with poor proxies, W, as proxied by
inheritance of physical wealth, may be sufficiently large relative to lifetime
earnings that our hypotheses about and 02 could hold in this sample i-f the
—7—simple model 4Chaveoutlined is correct.
The equation actually eE.timated is:
(5')log (Estate) =+8T*+0 TU+ log(Inheritance) +82
ET +8Male,
Wemeasure the dependent variable as the loqarithm of one plus the value (in
1967 dollars) of the estate left by the individual. Initial wealth is proxied
by one plus the value (in 1967 dollars) of the bequest the individual received
from his or her parents. Since people who receive their inheritances earl icr
have greater initial wealth (because of the interest that can accumulate on
that inheritance), we also include, following Menchik (1979), ET, a weighted
average of the differences between the dates of death of each parent and of
the child.4 No data are available on earnings or any of the standard human
capital measures that affect earnings. However, we do know that female
labor—force participation during the lives of members of our sample was far
below that of men, and that wage discrimination by sex also existed.
Accordingly, a dummy variable equalling one for males is also included in (5')
as a partial proxy for differences in M.
For a number of sample members data were only available on one parent.
For these people we treat the second parent as if he or she died between ages
60 and 80. Also, for those people who died before age 55, or predeceased one
or both parents, we calculate T*1 and/or T*2 based on information available at
the time of the individual's death.
Of the full sample of 165 usable observations, 81 had one or more
sib] ings in the sample. The OLS estimates of the residuals from equation (5')
can thus be used to examine the extent to which there is a correlation of the
error terms within families. The intra—class correlation coefficient of the
residuals for these observations is a measure of this correlation, p..5 To the
—8—extent that this correlation is important it also suggests that the OLS
estimates of (5) are inefficient, and that some generalized least squares
method should be appl led to this equation.
IV. ResultE. and Discu.ior
Two aspects of the sample require us to estimate (5') on various
subsamples as well as on the entire 165 observations. First, one person left
no estate; for this person the dependent variable takes the value zero and
accounts for approximately 25 percent of the sample variance. Second, 15
people died before age 56. These include all but one of the people who
predeceased their parents. Thus for this group T*2 provides a poorer measure
of the horizon; and, uni ike for other sample members, T*1 is measured at ages
before 55. Accordingly we form three subsamples, respectively excluding the
person who left no estate, excluding early decedents, and excluding both of
these.
Table 1 shows the sample statistics on the T* and Tu measures for each of
the four samples. It is worth noting that there is substantial variation in
the T*, especially in T*2, which is measured at different ages for each sample
member, but even in T*1, which is measured at age 55 for each person (except
for early decedents). Also, the means of the Tu are negative, even for the
subsamples that exclude early decedents. Since the means of forecast errors
should equal zero if forecasts are on average correct, the negative means on
these measures suggest a bias in the forecasts we have attached to these
individuals. The sources of the bias and their potential effects on the
estimates o-f the parameters iii(5')are discussed below.
Table 2presentsthe estimates of equation (5') for each of the four
samples, in each case using horizons based on T*1 and T*2. The coefficients on




Entire Sample 21.33 —5.65 20.25 —4.57
(N =165) (2.54) (11.15) (4.33) (10.90
(14.8,27 .8) (—38.8,18.4) (10.3,33.7) (—38.8,20.6)
Reduced Sample 21.32 —5.73 20.16 —4.57
(N =164) (2.54) (11.14) (4.21) (10.93)
(14.8,27.8) (—38.8,18.4) (10.3,33.1) (—38.8,20.6)
Excluding Early
Decedents 21.59 —3.53 20.53 —2.48
(N =150) (2.39) (9.21) (4.30) (8.93)
(16.1,27.8) (—23.8,18.4) (12.0,33.7) (—22.8,20.6)
Reduced Sample 21.58 —3.60 20.45 —2.47
(N =149) (2.40) (9.21) (4.17) (8.96)
(16.1,27.8) (—23.8,18.4) (12.0,33.1) (—22.8,20.6)ET suggest that each extra year during which people owntheirinheritance adds
between 1 and 9 percent to their estates. The upper part of this range
implies a remarkably large real rate of return on the assets that form the
inheritances these people received. It is not inconceivable, though, that
this very wealthy sample is willing to undertake investments that are
sufficiently risky to yield a fairly high average real rate of return.6 The
coefficient on the dummyvariablefor men (who constitute about 60 percent of
the samples) is positive and quite large, as expected. While its magnitude
seems large, one should remember that this variable proxies any sex—related
differences in lifetime earnings, differences that may be big enough to
generate bequests that are about twice as large for men as for women.
The estimated intra—class correlation coefficients for the 81 sample
members (68 in the samples excluding early decedents) who belong to 34 (28)
separate farnil ies differ sharply depending on the sample used. If we include
early decedents these coefficients are all significantly positive at least at
the 95 percent level using the appropriate t—statistic. In the samples that
exclude early decedents, though, none achieves this level of significance.
There does appear to be some correlation within families in bequest behavior
(controlling for initial inheritance, duration of life, and our admittedly
poor proxy for lifetime earnings). The low correlation, at least in the
samples excluding early decedents, suggests that any inefficiency in the
estimates of the parameters that is induced by our failure to account for
intra—farnily correlation in estimating (51)islikely to be unimportant.
The effect of extra years of unanticipated life, TU, on the size of the
person's estate varies greatly withthechoice of sample and proxy -for TU.
When we exclude early decedents and base the horizon on people's life
expectancy at age 55, we find either an unexpected positive impact or no
—10—Table 2. Estimates of (5') ——DependentVariable is Log (Estate)a
Sample Size
N=149 N=150 N=164 N=l65
Constant .139 .648 —0.008 1.558 2.7342.604 2.3523.366
(.08) (.49) (—.01) (.96) (1.81) (2.16) (1.33) (2.34)
log .530 .546 .506 .521 .391 .401 .372 .382
(Inheritance) (8.18) (8.67) (6.49) (6.69) (7.03) (7.43) (5.74) (5.91)
ET .017 .061 .051 .083 .014 .059 .045 .079
(1.08) (3.07) (2.73) (3.43) (.89) (3.02) (2.51) (3.42)
Male 1.210 1.061 1.128 .869 .929 .866 .861 .675
(3.89) (3.92) (3.01) (2.60) (3.13) (3.27) (2.49) (2.13)
.240 .211 .201 .184
(3.79) (2.77) (3.52) (2.76)
.029 —.003 .007 —.020
(1.71) (—.18) (.46) (—1.15)
.160 .099 .151 .096
(4.87) (2.49) (4.75) (2.59)
—.015 —.037 —.030 —.046
(—.73) (—1.51) (—1.65) (—2.12)
.357 .388 .267 .265 .285 .323 .221 .223
.134 .163 .212 .244 .363 .360 .412 .410
t—stat1stics in parentheses.effect on the size of the estate. When early decedents are included and the
horizon is based on life expectancy at the death of the second parent, the
irpact is negative and significant. Hover,asenoted in Section III, the
computation of both horizon measures T*1 and T*2 has problems in the case of
earlydecedents.
Theseconsiderations suggest that themostreliable estimates cone from
the samples that excludeearly decedents. That being the case, the results in
theTable can best be interpreted as implying that there is little if any
effect of extra yearsol u <pc ted I ife meon the size of theestate.
Perhaps the best conclusion to be drawn from these estimates is that, given
the way we have proxied the horizon using point estimates, unplanned bequests
do not seem important.
UnI ike the coefficients on Tu, those on the proxies for the horizon, T*,
are significantly positive in all four samples and for both farms of this
proxy.7Ifthe errors in measuring lifetime resources had little impact
because those resources were small relative to initialwealth in this sample,
wewould expect the point estimate of the horizonto have a negative effect on
thesize of the estate. The result is thus clearly quite surprising. There
are three possible explanations for this finding. The first is simply a
measurementproblem: People's expectations, asproxied by the T*, overshoot
the actual ages at death. s Table 1 showed, TU ison average negative in
this sample.We know (Hamermesh, 1985) that the estimates ofand I' used to
formthe T* are far above what epidemiological evidence indicates to be the
true relation of parents' to offspring's longevity. Since many more people in
the sample had long— than short—lived parents, this consideration suggests why
T* could overestimate the actual horizon, and why higher T* would be
associated with a larger estate. This possibility does not, however, explain
—11—the -failure to observe a sign if icant neQative impact of TU or the size o-f the
estate.
A second possibility is based on our inability to measure differences in
li-feumeearnings (except weakly with the dummy variable indicating the
decedent's 5CX:l4hilewe argued that lifetime earnings are small relative to
initial wealth, the lack ofqoodmeasures of earnings may still imply that our
proxies for the horizon also proxy lifetime earnings. Since higher lifetime
earnings are associated with higher consumption and larger bequests, this can
explain the significant positive effect of T*. However, since TT—T*, T' will
be negatively correlated with 1 ifetirne earnings if T* is partly a proxy for
earnings. That correlation should have resulted in an even more negative
coefficient on TU than we would have observed if a good measure of lifetime
earnings had been available. Thus this measurement problem too can explain
the results on T* quite well, but cannot explain the general insignficarice of
the coefficients on TU.
A third explanation, more in the nature of a specification than a
measurement problem, is that it may not be correct to focus only on the means
of people's subjective survival distributions. In particular, Harnerrnesh
(1985) showed that having long—lived parents significantly increases the
variance of this distribution. Thus our proxies for the horizon are also
inextricably proxies for the degree of uncertainty about the horizon. I-f
risk—averse consumers facing imperfect annuities markets accumulate assets
sufficient to maintain consumption throughout a possibly quite long
retirement, we would observe estates being left by people who had no bequest
motive pr se. As Davies <1981) discusses, this effect will be especially
pronounced for those facing the greatest uncertainty (those who have the
highest value of our measure of T*).
-12-V. Cort I u.
In this study wehaveconstructed arnodel designed to examine the effects
of differences in individuals' subjective horizons and years of unexpected
longevity on their terminal wealth. Using a transformation of actuarial data
and their parents longevity to proxy the horizon of a sample of wealthy
decedents, we have found a significant positive effect of proxies for the
horizon, but no significant effect of unexpected years of life. Both findings
are inconsistent with a simple model of a consumer with fixed lifetime
earnings who derives utility from consumption and bequests and plans around a
point estimate of the horizon. Two measurement problems help explain the
first result, but neither can explain the insignificant effect of unexpected
years of life. A third possibility is that our proxies for the horizon also
proxy uncertainty about it, so that we cannot distinguish between the effects
of a longer horizon and increased uncertainty on the size of bequests.
It is unl ikely that something that affects the mean of the distribution
of subjective survival probabil ities does not also affect its variance, since
both stem from the same underlying distribution of subjective survival
probabil ities. This suggests that the current state of our knowledge makes
the distinction between planned an unplanned bequests empirically
problematic. Only with substantially more research on the nature of
subjective survival distributions, and careful modell ing of proxies for their
means and variances, can one hope to distinguish the relative importance of
planned and unplanned bequests, and of bequests in the form of asset; that
remain at the end of n unctrinH-fetrne.
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15 —FOOTNOTES
There is some evidence (Harnermesh, 1984b) that labor supply, and thus
lifetime earnings, are independent of the horizon T*, though Wolfe (1983) • ithisis not the case for early decedents.
2. Among a sample of older couples with no earninqs in 1973 (Hamermesh.
404a), average earninps in 1975 totalled only $93.
3. This may be induced by economic incentives associated with the interaction
of ubl ic and private pension proorarns; see Lazear (1979).
4. The weights are the sizes of each parent's estate.
5. Kendall—Stuart (1973. p.315) discuss how this correlation can be
estimated in the presence of groups of varying sizes.
6. That the coefficients on ET are larper when T*2 and T'2 are used is the
unsurprising result of the introduction of multicollinearity between these
measures and ET. This problem does not exist when the other measures, which
are based on the horizon at a given aQe, are used.
7. This is not due to a confusion of the T* with secular improvements in
longevity: When the date of death is added to (5'), the significant positive
effects of T* remain.